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on what the Justices said, or should have said, to one another. 
Kalven rarely ventures into the broader litigation process, let alone 
"social" analysis. 6 
To be fair, Kalven himself recognized that, by plunging into 
the Court's own first amendment opinions and waging his war of 
position, he ran the risk of missing other battles. One of his margi-
nal notes concedes that his intensive effort to reconnoiter the field of 
Court opinions left him with a ''philosophic map" of free speech 
that ignored at least "three facts: the sheer weight of broadcasting, 
the sheer weight of advertising, and the ownership of the means of 
communication." It is this larger project-to understand, and to 
confront in appropriate political ways the economic, social, and cul-
tural dimensions of communication in the twentieth century-that 
Harry Kalven, Jr., has left to others. 7 If A Worthy Tradition lacks 
the comprehensive "map" that he himself had hoped to leave be-
hind, this is still a text that should both provoke and inspire. Stu-
dents of the first amendment owe a great debt to Professor 
Kalven-and to the two people, Jaime Kalven and Owen Fiss, who 
translated his manuscript into his book. 
ELITES AND THE IDEA OF EQUALITY. By Sidney 
Verba, 1 Steven Kelman,2 Gary R. Orren,J Ichiro Miyake, Joji 
Watanuki, lkuo Kabashima and G. Donald Ferree, Jr.4 Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press. 1987. $30.00. 
Steven H. Balch s 
Elites and the Idea of Equality reports the results of an inquiry 
into the views that "elites" in the United States, Sweden, and Japan 
hold about the various permutations of the idea of equality. The 
elites examined represent a variety of domains, including leaders in 
politics, business, labor, bureaucracy, media, and the intellectual 
world. The leaders of several insurgent groups consisting of femi-
nist, minority, and youth organizations are also surveyed. 
6. See, e.g., Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Theory. 50 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1205 (1983); R. POI.ENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS (1987). 
7. See, e.g., Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986). 
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2. Associate Professor of Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 
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3. Department of Public Policy. John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
University. 
4. Professor of Political Science, University of Connecticut, Storrs. 
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Some of the findings are interesting. We learn, for example, 
that virtually all the groups studied underrated-in comparison to 
the estimate of others-the degree of political influence they pos-
sessed, tending to view themselves as beleaguered by their rivals' 
assaults. Most of the findings, however, are quite predictable. For 
example: Americans' individualism allows them to accept greater 
amounts of economic inequality than the Swedes, while the sense of 
group solidarity displayed by the Japanese bestows special responsi-
bility on private groups, such as the corporation and the family, for 
maintaining welfare functions assumed by the state in the West. 
Their data, the authors argue at some length, reveals that con-
flicts over political equality are more intense and likely to be harder 
to resolve than those involving economic disparities. One reason 
for this, they claim, is that the measures of political standing are far 
less exact than those of relative income, so that conflicts over how 
to divide the pie are exacerbated further by disagreements over who 
already has a big piece. More important, economic differences have 
come to be more or less accepted as inevitable consequences of the 
need to maintain productivity incentives. Political equality, in con-
trast, is almost universally regarded as a matter of absolute right, 
serving as a validation of personal dignity and full citizenship. 
Most of the book's discussion of political equality centers on 
voting and access to centers of government power. Though some 
questions pertaining to "gender" equality are addressed as well, is-
sues of legal equality and protection from public and private dis-
crimination-what in the United States have come to be known as 
the realm of "civil rights"-are largely ignored. Yet as far as the 
United States is concerned, it is here that the authors' insight about 
the especially delicate quality of status conflicts is most pertinent. 
And this is particularly true with respect to the politics of constitu-
tional interpretation. 
One of the most significant developments in the evolution of 
American political culture has been the transformation of the con-
cept of private property from something enshrined within the edi-
fice of natural rights theory to something defined and limited by 
positive law and considerations of social utility. Two hundred years 
ago, and for a long time thereafter, attempts to interfere with the 
use of private property or the right to contract were often regarded 
not only as wrongheaded disruptions of natural economic forces but 
also as violations of the rights of man. Consequently, the courts 
were less hesitant to overrule economic regulations. Today, of 
course, such matters are considered to be the virtually unchallenged 
monopoly of politicians, an allocation of power that has obvious 
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substantive overtones. On the other hand, questions of political and 
civil equality are increasingly pulled into the orbit of the judiciary. 
If Verba and his colleagues err, it is in thinking that the prefer-
ence given to political rights over those conventionally thought of as 
purely economic reflects some sort of eternal truth. American his-
tory reveals that this primacy is rather recent and the result of so-
cial changes of types that a time-bound study of this nature is 
unlikely to detect. Moreover, within the American political system 
this shift of attitudes is of the utmost significance: so long as prop-
erty questions are seen as matters more profane than sacred, we can 
confidently expect that, for better or worse, many constitutional 
scholars will continue to favor narrow interpretations of the prop-
erty clauses of the Constitution. 
CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH. By Sanford Levinson.t 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1988. Pp. xii, 243. 
$19.95. 
Herbert Hovenkamp2 
This well written, intelligent volume takes up a subject that is 
too big for its two hundred forty-three pages, but takes it up well 
nonetheless. Professor Sanford Levinson seeks to discover the reli-
gious content of the Constitution. Not the religion clauses of the 
first amendment, but the civil religion of the Constitution as a 
whole. In what ways is belief in the Constitution like religious be-
lief? Specifically, in what ways are the various doctrines of consti-
tutional interpretation like the doctrines of religious, or scriptural, 
interpretation? How is the constitutional oath like the pledge of 
service that the religious believer might offer to his religious organi-
zation or his god? When does dissent or unlawful behavior amount 
to an admission that one is not "committed" to the Constitution, or 
to American constitutional government? Does the law school 
teacher of the Constitution have true academic freedom, liberally 
defined? Or do we have some overriding obligation of basic fidelity 
to the constitutional enterprise? These are big questions, and Pro-
fessor Levinson provides some perspectives, though not an answer, 
for each of them. 
Levinson notes that, ever since the Constitution was written, 
its supporters have used religious language and imagery to defend it 
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